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Failures of Rationality and Self-Knowledge in Addiction 1 
 
1. Introduction 
According to a traditional characterization, akrasia is the phenomenon of freely or intentionally 
acting against one’s knowledge, or belief, about what it is best for one to do, and against what one so 
rationally desires to do.2 Akrasia appears to be essential to addiction. Take Bill Wilson, the co-
founder of the Alcoholics Anonymous program of recovery.3 Bill Wilson possessed abundant 
evidence of the damaging and tragic consequences of his drinking; his alcoholic drinking had not 
only cost him numerous jobs and a promising career, it had placed his marriage under unbearable 
strain and led him to numerous periods of hospitalization and psychiatric care. He was not unaware 
of this evidence. He knew that the best course of action for him was to stop drinking, and he had a 
desire not to drink that cohered with this belief. For a long period of time, he attempted to stop 
drinking, seeking sources of relief both medical and religious for his problem. And yet despite what 
he knew, and despite the many reasons he possessed for staying sober, he continued to drink.4 
The notion of akrasia is not a philosopher’s invention, nor a notion of narrowly academic interest. 
Attempts to understand akrasia provide important aspects of the rationale for programmes of 
treatment and recovery for addicts. The impact of akrasia on the life of an addict and those around 
them is measured not only in the physical and financial consequences of their addiction. In their 
akratic behaviour, active addicts are hard to understand, and this is an important sense in which 
addicts are lost to, or estranged from, their friends and families. 
The topic of akrasia in addiction is the starting point of discussion here. The aims of this chapter are 
modest, and the focus is narrow. There is much here that remains programmatic. The overall aim of 
the chapter is to use reflection on the problem of akrasia in addiction to introduce into philosophical 
discussion of addiction the notion of a distinctive kind of ‘mental state’ and to try to show what 
explanatory work such a notion can do. I will here discuss not substance addiction in general, but 
                                                
1 Thanks to Nick Heather and Gabriel Segal for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Thanks also to 
Hemdat Lerman, Naomi Eilan, Rebecca Eilan, and Matthew Soteriou for helpful discussion. 
2 For similar characterizations of akrasia see Coope (2010), Lorenz (2014), Broadie (1991), ch.5, Charles 
(1984), ch.3, and Davidson (1970). The locus classicus for the traditional notion of akrasia is Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII. See Aristotle (2001), pp.385- 407 for detailed philosophical commentary. 
A different approach is developed in Holton (2009). For discussion of the implications of Davidson’s 
approach for contemporary addiction science see Heather and Segal (2013).  
3 For a brief history of Bill Wilson’s career as an active alcoholic see Alcoholics Anonymous (1939 
(2001)), chapter 1. 
4 Bill Wilson had his last drink in 1934, as the result of a conversation during a chance encounter with an 
old school friend. He remained continuously sober until his death in 1971. For more biographical detail 
see Alcoholics Anonymous (1984). 
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only certain aspects of alcoholism. And even then I will discuss only aspects of that condition as it is 
conceptualized from the point of view of one approach to treatment and recovery.  
Though the topic of the nature of alcoholism is a theme of this chapter, I make a few starting 
assumptions. I will be talking about alcoholism as the condition is found in human beings; beings 
with the powers of rationality and for self-consciousness. I assume that alcoholism is a condition 
essential to which is a pattern of repeated drinking. The pattern often begins in the alcoholic’s 
teenage years and then develops usually over a long period of time. I will take it to be essential to 
alcoholic drinking that it is marked by a degradation of control over the amount that is drunk. I 
assume that alcoholism is a condition that has a history, and that the way that alcoholism manifests 
itself develops over time with distinctive features in evidence at different stages in its progression. 
Alcoholics Anonymous is a self-help organization that was founded in 1935 and has grown to 
become the pre-eminent non-professional source of support for the recovering alcoholic. The 
question that is the point of entry for this chapter is: What account of akrasia, as a feature of 
alcoholism, does the literature of the Alcoholics Anonymous program offer? This discussion needs 
to be prefaced with an important qualification. The A.A. literature does not offer a formal statement 
of the problem of akrasia and an account of how to understand the problem. The book was written to 
help alcoholics recover, not to contribute to philosophical theory. Alcoholics Anonymous does not 
take any part in public or academic debates about alcoholism, and the discussion of alcoholism in its 
literature is not to be understood as constituting the endorsement of a position within such a public or 
academic debate.5 
This being said, professional philosophers are at liberty to do as they please with this literature. The 
core texts of the organization are available in their entirety, for free, on the website of Alcoholics 
Anonymous, and non-alcoholic members of the public are able to purchase copies of these texts from 
the A.A. website. Suppose professional philosophers were to treat what was advanced in the 
foundational texts of Alcoholics Anonymous as an attempt to explain akrasia. What is that account? 
In section 3, I sketch in that account. In section 4, I raise some questions about how elements of this 
account cohere. In the rest of the chapter, I make some suggestions about how this coherence is to be 
understood; suggestions that draw on a relatively neglected topic in the philosophy of mind. Here the 
approach is only drawn in outline. Questions of detail, and about the adequacy of this approach to 
akrasia, will be pursued elsewhere.  
2. Two Initial Responses 
                                                
5 Alcoholics Anonymous (1952), pp.176-179 provides a general characterization of Tradition Ten; that 
“Alcoholics Anonymous has no opinion on outside issues, hence the A.A. name ought never be drawn 
into public controversy.” The main consequence of this stance is the neutrality of Alcoholics Anonymous 
concerning matters of public health policy related to alcohol. 
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I want to determine some desiderata for the discussion that follows by considering briefly two 
natural responses to explaining akrasia. One such line of thought would be the view that alcoholic 
relapse involves a wholesale switch in attitudes and valuations; the relapsing alcoholic no longer 
knows or believes that it is best to abstain, and no longer desires to abstain. In their place are states 
such as a belief that it is unproblematic to take a drink and desirable to do so; states which then 
motivate action in the normal way. A second line of thought would be that the alcoholic’s drinking in 
relapse is not an instance of intentional action at all, but something like an automatic bodily 
movement; akin to the narrowing of the iris in response to changes in light. As such, it is not capable 
of being evaluated as either rational or irrational.  
Though I don’t have the space here to offer a fully satisfactory discussion of these lines of thought, 
there is good reason to think that they ought to be resisted. The difficulty with the first line of 
thought is how to make sense of what is involved in ‘losing’ and then ‘regaining’ the relevant 
attitudes about alcohol, during the period of relapse and recovery from relapse. The alcoholic who 
recovers consciousness after relapse does not need to re-acquire the knowledge that it is best for him 
to abstain from drinking or reacquire the desire not to drink. The guilt, shame and remorse that 
consumes him on waking is a manifestation of the presence of these states; and the best explanation 
for this is that those states persisted during the period of relapse, as such states persist during sleep. 
The second line of thought appears to involve an implausible characterization of relapse. Even if 
alcoholics do often fail to control their drinking in various ways, it at least makes sense for an 
alcoholic to attempt to control it, perhaps by exercising willpower in the face of temptation, or by 
exercising intelligence in avoiding temptation entirely. The idea of an alcoholic attempting to 
exercise control over his drinking makes sense in a way that it doesn’t make sense to think of an 
alcoholic attempting to refrain from narrowing his iris in the face of changes in illumination. 
Even if these approaches are wide of the mark, a good explanation of akrasia ought to be able to 
account for why these options are prima facie attractive. With respect to the first option, the 
alcoholic who relapses does appear to be acting in the light of at least some positive evaluation of 
drinking, however inchoate that evaluation may be. With respect to the second approach, even if it is 
not true that alcoholic drinking is simply a mindless reflex, rather than a full-blooded intentional 
action, it seems right that the alcoholic agent is ‘not fully present’ qua agent of intentional action, in 
those actions that constitute relapse. A satisfactory approach to akrasia in addiction ought to be able 
to explain this. 
3. Alcoholism according to Alcoholics Anonymous 
The links between alcoholism and relapse suggest that the natural way into this question is simply to 
look at some views about what alcoholism is. My focus here, as I have said, is to be on what the 
A.A. literature says about alcoholism. The book Alcoholics Anonymous describes alcoholism as a 
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‘three-fold’ illness, and these folds are characterized as ‘physical’, ‘mental’ and ‘spiritual’. This 
distinction between these three different elements of alcoholism suggest the view that alcoholic 
relapse, and alcoholic drinking, is a complex phenomenon, different aspects of which require 
different kinds of explanation. What follows is a summary of the different kinds of claims made in 
the prefaces, introduction and pages 1- 164 of this text. 
3.1 Bodily ‘abnormality’6  
Alcoholism involves a ‘physical allergy’ to alcohol (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001, p.xxviii). This is 
not an allergy in the sense in which one may be allergic to bee stings, but in the sense of its being an 
‘abnormal physical reaction’ to alcohol as a stimulus. When the alcoholic begins to drink ‘a 
phenomenon of craving’ is triggered, that causes him to continue drinking (Alcoholics Anonymous 
2001, p.xxviii). This abnormality of the body and of the body’s responses to alcohol is almost never 
found in the ‘average, or temperate’ drinker (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001, p.xxviii). Once this 
physical allergy is in place, alcoholics are not able to return to being non-alcoholic drinkers 
(Alcoholics Anonymous 2001, p.xxx, pp.30- 4). Because alcoholics in whom the physical allergy has 
developed cannot return to being normal drinkers, the only lasting solution for those suffering from 
alcoholism is abstinence (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001, p.xxviii). The occurrence of a craving in this 
sense does not in itself explain the onset of relapse. The phenomenon of craving is specifically 
understood as a craving for more drink, once the alcoholic has started to drink. But the fact that the 
phenomenon of craving develops on taking the first drink explains why an alcoholic, once he begins 
drinking, finds that he has little control over the amount that he drinks or the rate at which he drinks, 
and drinks more than he intended, desired or wanted to drink. According to A.A., part of the 
explanation of akrasia, at least as it is a feature of the development and prolongation of an episode of 
drinking, must make reference to this component of the condition. 
3.2 Mental ‘abnormality’7 
The typical alcoholic is aware of the painful consequences of his abnormal bouts of drinking. In the 
middle of his hangover, and the shame he feels about last night’s behaviour, he decides to ‘swear off’ 
and ‘never touch another drop’. He may put in place various strategies to prevent himself from 
drinking. But the time will come at which his patterns of thinking around alcohol change. He will 
begin to engage in attempts to rationalize why he lost control when he last drank, rationalization that 
sustains plans for further attempts at controlled, moderate and pleasurable drinking. At the times 
when he most needs it, his awareness of the painful and destructive consequences of his drinking 
appears to desert him: “The almost certain consequences of his drinking and the pain and suffering 
                                                
6 This section summarizes p. xxv- xxxii. The physical problem in alcoholics is described as an 
‘abnormality’ on p. xxvi. 
7 This section summarizes material from Alcoholics Anonymous 2001, chapter 3.  
 5 
of a few days or weeks will not crowd into the mind to deter him. If they do, they are immediately 
replaced with threadbare excuses and spurious rationalizations. The alcoholic is without mental 
defence against the first drink.” (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001, p.24). Not only do alcoholics appear 
to exhibit ‘mental abnormality’ in the sense of being ‘without mental defence’ when they are actively 
attempting to pursue strategies of relapse prevention. The alcoholic, when not drunk, and while 
knowing the harmful and dangerous consequences of his drinking, will typically spend much of his 
time thinking about drinking and planning his next drink. This thinking and planning, and the 
prospect of drinking at a later time, is itself a kind of relief to him (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001, 
pp.8-9). This is the alcoholic’s ‘mental obsession’ with drinking alcohol. This mental obsession, and 
the ‘strange mental blank spots’ (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001, p.42) that precede episodes of 
drinking constitute ‘a subtle form of insanity’ (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001, p.40). A central feature 
of these ‘strange mental blank spots’ and the obsession with alcohol that grips him is that the 
alcoholic is all but oblivious to the facts about his situation, and to their role in his drinking 
(Alcoholics Anonymous 2001, p.40- 2). 
3.3 A ‘spiritual malady’8  
At the core of the alcoholic condition is a problem with how the alcoholic lives, and the 
consequences of action that expresses malformed attitudes he has to himself and to others. 
“Selfishness—self-centredness! This, we think, is the root of our troubles.” (Alcoholics 
Anonymous 2001, p.62). Selfishness and self-centredness appear to be character traits of some 
kind. They describe a distinctive pattern of motivation. The alcoholic is only concerned, at 
bottom, with acting in a way motivated by getting what he wants, and maximizing his own 
desire-satisfaction. Satisfying other people, and acting in a way that satisfies their desires, is an 
aim of the alcoholic’s behaviour only insofar as it is a means to satisfying his own desires. These 
patterns of motivation set the self-centred alcoholic at odds with others (Alcoholics Anonymous 
2001, p.62). As well as describing what appears to be a general pattern of motivation, self-
centredness also characterizes a range of other traits, propensities and emotional or affective 
conditions. The alcoholic is characteristically ruled by ‘fear’ (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001, 
pp.67-8), or “self-centred fear—primarily fear that we would lose something we already 
possessed or would fail to get something we demanded…” (Alcoholics Anonymous 1952, p.76) 
and, specifically, that he does not have, or will not, for some reason, elicit the approval of others. 
The self-centred alcoholic is ‘burned up with resentment’ (Alcoholics Anonymous, 2001, pp.64-
5) at others, resentments the sources of which are nearly always the result of the alcoholic’s own 
self-centred action or inaction, and often stem from the alcoholic’s perception of ‘hurt pride’, 
‘fear’, and ‘self-pity’.  
                                                
8 This description of alcoholism is from Alcoholics Anonymous 2001, p.64. 
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The alcoholic’s self-centredness, understood in all these different manifestations, causes 
problems to pile up in the alcoholic’s life. The alcoholic becomes ‘restless, irritable and 
discontented’ (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001, pp. xxviii-xxix). Alcohol begins to be represented 
as a route through which these problems in living can be ameliorated, escaped, or even solved. 
And, as so represented, it comes to be ‘desired’ or ‘wanted’ by the alcoholic. The alcoholic who 
relapses appears to have lost sight of the destructive consequences of drinking, and so has 
become unable to stick to whatever resolution or commitment he may have made to stay sober.  
The Alcoholics Anonymous program of recovery involves the alcoholic’s complete abstinence 
from alcohol. At the heart of this program is the idea that for the alcoholic to achieve permanent 
and satisfying recovery from active addiction, it is the ‘spiritual malady’ that needs to be 
addressed (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001, p.64). It would be a cause for despair in the suffering 
alcoholic, and false, were complete removal of these habits, tendencies and patterns of thought 
and action claimed to be a condition of achieving sobriety. And the A.A. literature doesn’t claim 
that it is. Rather, through taking part in A.A. life, the alcoholic is able to gradually alter and 
adjust his outlook on life. He does this by engaging in a range of activities that encourage this: 
working towards an honest and detailed examination of his own behaviour (Step Four) and 
arriving at a sober assessment of the consequences of that behaviour for himself and others with 
an A.A. friend or ‘sponsor’ (Step Five), making a sincere attempt to right wrongs done to others, 
where possible (Steps Eight and Nine); engaging in ‘service’ for the group, whether that be 
speaking in front of the group, setting the chairs out, or making tea; keeping in regular contact 
with, and engaging honestly with, fellow recovering alcoholics; engaging in regular self-
examination and meditation (Steps Ten and Eleven), and most importantly, helping newly-
recovering alcoholics to stay sober (Step Twelve). This process of re-engagement with sober life 
is described as ‘finding a power by which we could live’ and finding ‘a Power greater than 
ourselves.’ Step Three asks the alcoholic to turn his will and his life ‘over to the care of God as 
we understood Him.’ Alcoholics Anonymous is not a religious organization, and neither is it 
denominational. The spirituality involved here is minimal in its commitments. To solve their 
problems, recovering alcoholics need to discover a source of strength by which they can live, 
which is something more than their own, failed, strategies for achieving sobriety.  
Let’s refocus on the puzzle of akrasia with which we began. Suppose for the moment that the species 
of akratic action that is the focus of discussion is that which accompanies the onset of drinking. And 
suppose for the moment that the triggering of a phenomenon of a craving cannot explain this event 
(being something that occurs after the first drink has been taken). Then the conception of akrasia in 
alcoholism suggested by the kind of account offered here is that such action is the manifestation of a 
kind of mental disorder. This mental disorder manifests itself in the way that an alcoholic, prior to 
relapse, relates both to what he knows about the past consequences of his drinking and also to how 
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he currently evaluates taking a drink. The alcoholic fails to bring these past consequences to mind in 
the way that is needed to preserve his sobriety. And he is subject to desires or wants for alcohol that 
motivate his drinking, motivations that make his drinking explicable as an action and not a mere 
reflex or piece of involuntary behaviour, and that mark his drinking out as an attempt to gain relief 
from problems in living. These problems of living have their source in patterns of ‘self-centred’ 
thought and action, which may or may not involve drinking. These patterns of thought and action 
themselves we can also think of as the manifestation of some more basic form of ethical 
maladjustment of the subject, concerning how the agent conceives of himself, and how he relates to 
other agents.  
4. Some questions about the Alcoholics Anonymous account 
I want to develop some suggestions about how to understand aspects of this approach by raising a 
number of questions that might be prompted by the discussion so far. 
4.1 A central part of the explanation of relapse is that the alcoholic suffers a specific kind of 
incapacitation with respect to his preserved knowledge about what he did and how he behaved when 
he last drank. But what is disordered—‘insane’ even—about incapacitation? A rational agent who is 
asleep, and in dreamless sleep, is incapacitated, in a very specific way, with respect to the full range 
of his mental powers, including the capacity to draw on preserved knowledge. But such an agent 
isn’t disordered in virtue of being so incapacitated. So what exactly is the link between the idea of 
incapacitation and the kind of ‘disorder’ that’s at issue here? 
4.2 In some parts of Alcoholics Anonymous, it is suggested that the alcoholic has no idea why he 
relapses. Here is an example from chapter 2: “If you ask him why he started on that last bender, the 
chances are he will offer you any one of a hundred alibis. Sometimes these excuses have a certain 
plausibility, but none of them really makes sense in the light of the havoc an alcoholic’s drinking 
bout creates…. Once in a while, he may tell the truth. And the truth, strange to say, is usually that he 
has no more idea why he took that drink than you have. Some drinkers have excuses with which they 
are satisfied part of the time. But in their hearts they really do not know why they do it.” (Alcoholics 
Anonymous 2001, p.23). One of the distinguishing features of intentional action appears to be that 
the agent who is engaged in such action knows what the action is intended to bring about without 
observation or inference, simply in virtue of being the author of that action.9 When I am engaged in 
the intentional action of walking to the shop to buy milk I know that that is what I am doing just by 
being the one doing the walking. But if the alcoholic who relapses does not know why he drank then 
that might suggest that his drinking—according to this approach—is not an instance of intentional 
action at all, but some other occurrence that involves bodily movement: a piece of reflex or 
                                                
9 For important discussions of this feature of intentional action see Anscombe (1957), Moran (2001), and 
the papers collected in Roessler and Eilan (2003). 
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involuntary behaviour, say. So how does the idea that the alcoholic is ignorant of why he drinks, 
when he relapses, cohere with the idea that his drinking is a case of intentional action? 
4.3 In the account sketched out above, a claim was that alcoholics use alcohol in an attempt to deal 
with emotional difficulties and other problems with living. This motivation for drinking is expressed 
in many of the recovery narratives that make up the “Personal Stories” sections of Alcoholics 
Anonymous. For example: “Bewilderment, fear and resentment moved into my life. And yet my 
ability to lie outwardly and to kid myself inwardly grew with each drink I took. Indeed, I had to 
drink now to live, to cope with the demands of everyday existence. When I encountered 
disappointments or frustrations—as I did more and more frequently—my solution was to drink.” 
(Alcoholics Anonymous 2001, p.555). This prompts two further questions: 
How does the idea that the alcoholic uses alcohol as a way to solve problems with living cohere with 
the idea that alcoholics do not really know why they drink? 
Given the facts about what drinking does to an alcoholic, facts of which the alcoholic is aware, the 
idea that the alcoholic thinks that the solution to disappointments, frustrations or other problems is 
for him to drink seems so extraordinary that it is simply unclear why we ought to attribute such 
motivation to him. Is this really what motivates the drinking that constitutes relapse, or just a 
spurious piece of post-hoc rationalization; an “excuse” that “doesn’t really make sense in the light of 
the havoc that an alcoholic’s drinking bout creates”? If this is the motivation, how is it that alcohol is 
supposed to help? What kind of solution is it that the alcoholic uses alcohol in an attempt to achieve? 
5. Defects of the wakeful state in alcoholism 
5.1 The link between the notion of disorder and incapacitation can be illuminated by a particular 
notion of a ‘mental state’ and by the notion of what is proper to that state. The inaccessibility of 
knowledge about past attempts to drink safely or moderately is proper to the state of sleep in a way 
that it is not proper to the state that obtains during relapse. There is much that is not well understood 
about the details of the functional role of the state of sleep in the life of an animal. But the outline of 
the role is clear enough; sleep is a condition in which the animal is alive, but at rest. In this state the 
animal is able to recover from fatigue, and so through sleeping it is able to continue to function 
effectively as an animal during the time it is awake. What enables it to fulfill this function is that in 
sleep the animal ‘switches off’, where to be switched off is for the animal to be incapacitated with 
respect to the powers or capacities that it possesses.10 The facts about how animals rest may differ. 
Some animals may shut off in different ways to others.11 But sleep in mature human beings is a state 
                                                
10 An account along these lines is presented in sections 1 and 2 of Aristotle’s De Somno. For introductory 
material on the contemporary research on sleep see Hobson (2002) and the essays in Smith, Comella and 
Hogl (2008). 
11 For interesting discussion of ‘unihemispheric slow-wave sleep’ in animals see Rattenborg, Lima and 
Amlaner (1998). 
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in which it is shut off with respect to what appears to be the full range of the capacities it possesses 
as a rational animal; its capacities for physical action, sense-perception, intentional mental action and 
memory, amongst others. The unavailability of capacities in the state of sleep is not an instance of 
mental disorder. So the unavailability or inaccessibility of memory in sleep is not an instance of 
disorder.  
But the unavailability of capacities when the agent is in a state of wakeful consciousness is 
disordered. The nature of the state of wakeful consciousness is a question that has been largely 
neglected by philosophers of mind and action.12 But at least to a first approximation, wakeful 
consciousness is that state in which the animal is ‘switched on’; the waking animal is in the position 
to be at work being an animal. Its being capacitated in this way normally entails that it is capacitated 
with respect to each of the capacities it possesses as an animal.13 What it is for an animal to be awake 
depends on what capacities it possesses. In the case of rational animals—those creatures with the 
capacity for rationality and self-conscious thought—being awake is being in the state in which it is in 
the position to be at work being a rational animal. Then for a rational animal to be awake, but to be 
incapacitated with respect to some of the capacities that it possesses as a rational animal, will prevent 
it from being in the position to be properly at work as the kind of thing that it is. States such as this 
will be varieties of the wakeful condition but which constitute forms of failure given the nature of 
that condition. Take, for instance, the state of shock or trauma that can come to obtain after 
witnessing extremely painful, disturbing or dangerous episodes. In a state of shock, an animal is 
awake, but temporarily incapable of accessing its powers of intentional mental action and for self-
initiated bodily movement; forms of incapacitation that issue in confusion and disorientation. Even if 
the state of shock may have a biological function, it is nevertheless a disordered state. Shock is a 
state that inherits the aims of the wakeful condition, given that it is a type of wakeful condition. But 
it fails to fulfill the explanatory goals of the wakeful state; it is a state in which in which the animal is 
not properly in the position to be at work being an animal, because it involves incapacity of the 
relevant kinds. 
While we have a notion of ‘being obsessed with something’ according to which it is a long-term 
character trait, we can also think of the state that precedes relapse in the alcoholic as a state of 
obsession with alcohol understood along the lines just proposed. The alcoholic who is obsessed with 
alcohol in this sense is in a kind of wakeful state that is deformed or degraded in various ways. 
Central to this is the incapacity to bring to mind in the right way the memory of the suffering and 
humiliation of previous relapses. A kind of knowledge that is available to the drinker in the normal 
non-degraded state of wakefulness is here not capable of being brought into play in determining what 
                                                
12 An exception is the discussion of wakeful consciousness in O’Shaughnessy (2000), part 1. See also 
Crowther (forthcoming). 
13 For interesting discussion and argument for a view of this kind see Aristotle De Somno sections 1 and 2. 
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to do. Characteristic also of the state is the alcoholic’s pre-occupation with thoughts about drinking, 
with the construction of plans for drinking, as well as immediately ‘reading’ his environment in 
terms of a series of opportunities for, or obstacles to, drinking. This conception of obsession suggests 
answers to the other questions raised. 
5.2 Suppose that the intentions with which an agent acts are his reasons for acting. Then we may 
respond to the question posed in 4.2 with the following thought. The alcoholic in the state of 
obsession has reasons for action. But they are extremely minimal. These reasons may be no more 
than that it seemed to the alcoholic that taking a drink is what ought to be done, or that taking a drink 
is what the situation calls for. So the alcoholic’s drinking can be understood as intentional. The 
alcoholic drinks with the intention of doing what, in this particular situation in which a drink is 
offered, is to be done, or what the situation calls for. The event that occurs when the alcoholic drinks 
can, then, be distinguished from a mindless or reflexive bodily movement.  
In the passage that prompted this question, the claim was that the alcoholic “does not really know 
why” he started out on that last relapse. We can respond that there is some minimal knowledge that 
the alcoholic has of why he drank; knowledge that he might express by citing the trivial and minimal 
reasons for drinking just discussed. This is consistent with two further truths. The first is that there is 
some deeper and more informative explanation of why he drank of which the alcoholic is ignorant. 
The second is that if the alcoholic is asked why he took that drink, given his drinking history, then 
giving such minimal reasons for action will indeed seem like a particularly inadequate, evasive and 
uninformative answer. 14 But that doesn’t entail that they weren’t his reasons. 
A natural question at this point is why things strike the alcoholic in this way; why it seems to him 
that drinking was what was to be done. The peculiarity of these reasons, in the light of the actual 
consequences of his drinking, is to be explained by features of his mental state. In a state of 
obsession with alcohol, the world presents itself to the alcoholic in a distinctive way. In a state of 
obsession with alcohol, and when the opportunity to drink arises, taking a drink presents itself to the 
alcoholic as what is there and then, in those circumstances, to be done, or to be what the situation 
calls for. The alcoholic acts on reasons for drinking that he has, given his state of obsession with 
alcohol. 
5.3.1 The idea that alcoholics drink to deal with frustrations, disappointments and problems with 
living coheres easily enough with the idea that alcoholics do not really know why they drink. 
Perhaps there are occasions on which alcoholics deliberately and knowingly drink in order to deal 
with problems. But the more natural way to understand such testimony as was quoted in section 4.3 
is as articulating a pattern of motivation for alcoholic drinking of which the agent was unaware when 
                                                
14 That this response is so inadequate may be why such an alcoholic may be happy to concede, under 
interrogation, that he has no idea at all about why he drank. 
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drinking. That alcoholics can be ignorant of the sources of motivation for their action is no more 
problematic, on the face of it, than any similar claim about the existence of unconscious motivations 
for action. 
This issue about awareness of reasons for action reveals another way in which the notion of a mental 
state may be mobilized in explanation. When they are in the state that precedes and accompanies 
relapse, alcoholics lack self-awareness or self-knowledge of various kinds. And it is plausible that at 
least some such absences of self-awareness can be traced to various respects in which the state of 
obsession differs from the normal and properly formed state of wakeful consciousness. One who is 
in the state of non-degraded wakefulness normally knows, when he is in that state, why he is doing 
what it is that he is then doing. And he normally knows what mental state he is in at that time. But at 
the time they drink, alcoholics do not have an awareness of the real reasons for their drinking. They 
are, perhaps, aware of the minimal reasons for action. But they are not aware that their drinking is, 
for example, aimed at ‘coping with the demands of everyday existence’. Further, what makes the 
state of obsession so dangerous for alcoholics is that they are oblivious to their being in this state. In 
the state of obsession, alcoholics, I will say, lack ‘occurrent self-knowledge’ of various kinds. 
Another characteristic failure of self-awareness is worth distinguishing from this. An alcoholic may 
have acquired (let us just assume) knowledge about his condition. He knows that he has a physical 
allergy to alcohol, that at times he has ‘no defence against the first drink’ and that his absence of 
such defence is associated with a condition of obsession in which certain bizarre forms of motivation 
prevail. Nevertheless he may drink, and he may drink as a result of becoming obsessed with alcohol. 
Such an alcoholic didn’t lose this knowledge about himself. He doesn’t have to reacquire it when he 
wakes up after a relapse. But in the state of obsession this knowledge wasn’t accessible to him in the 
way that it is in a normal state of wakeful consciousness, where memory makes it available to the 
rational agent in the normal way. So, where an obsessed alcoholic does possess knowledge of his 
alcoholic condition of the ‘dispositional’ kind, incapacitation with respect to memory renders this 
kind of self-knowledge inaccessible to him. 
5.3.2 Perhaps there are many different ways in which the alcoholic may attempt to solve his 
emotional difficulties by drinking. I want to explore just one, which relates to the way that the 
alcoholic, when in a state of obsession, represents his drinking. Consider the descriptions that 
recovered alcoholics offer of their early experiences of drinking. “A few years later, in junior high 
school, a few friends and I got a bottle of rum from a bootlegger. I got really drunk and it was great. I 
had a feeling of complete freedom.” (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001, p.495). “Drinking released me 
from the suffocating fear, the feelings of inadequacy, and the nagging voices at the back of my head 
that told me I would never measure up. All of those things melted away when I drank.” (Alcoholics 
Anonymous 2001, p.310). “(I) do remember this much: When I was drinking, I was okay. I 
understood. Everything made sense. I could dance, talk, and enjoy being in my own skin. It was as if 
 12 
I had been an unfinished jigsaw puzzle with one piece missing; as soon as I took a drink, the last 
piece instantly and effortlessly snapped into place” (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001, p.320).  
The content of these descriptions of drinking experiences plays a part in explaining the alcoholic’s 
motivation for drinking. When in the state of obsession with alcohol, alcoholics don’t represent their 
drinking as a route to loss of control and to physical and emotional damage. They represent drinking 
as a mode of self-realization; as a route through which they can be the way they are supposed to be. 
Again, it can be helpful to think of this form of motivation in terms of the notion of a state of 
consciousness. The alcoholic attempts to use alcohol as a solution to his problems because he 
represents alcohol, in the obsessive condition, as a way of changing the prevailing psychological 
condition to one in which he is in a non-defective and normal wakeful state of consciousness; that 
psychologically healthy state in which he is in a position to exercise those rational and affective 
capacities that make him the kind of being that he is. That includes being in the position to ‘think 
straight’ about things, to interact sanely and normally with other people, and being in a position in 
which he is not assailed by self-doubt, fearful thoughts and other troubling occurrent emotions. The 
past-tense content of these descriptions offered by recovering alcoholics is also relevant to the point 
at issue here. Alcoholics in an occurrent state of obsession with alcohol represent their drinking as 
being capable of putting them into a normal psychologically healthy wakeful state because they 
recollect, or appear to recollect, that alcohol had these liberating effects on them on certain occasions 
of drinking in the past. “The idea that somehow, someday, he will control and enjoy his drinking is 
the great obsession of every abnormal drinker” (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001, p.30) is, at least in 
part, the idea that someday the alcoholic will control and enjoy his drinking in the way that he takes 
it that he used to. 
6. Another defect of the normal wakeful condition 
In the light of the idea of a distinction between defective and non-defective states of wakefulness, 
two kinds of error might be distinguished in this reconstructed motivation. One kind is obvious. For 
the chronic alcoholic, drinking does not have the desired effect. Drinking in relapse, for the chronic 
alcoholic subject to an obsession with alcohol, does not bring about a return to a normal non-
degraded condition of consciousness. It brings only more of the same. And this is surely part of what 
is distinctive of chronic alcoholic drinking. The chronic alcoholic, when drinking, remains obsessed 
with drinking. His excessive pre-occupation with drinking now manifests itself in extending 
indefinitely the episode of drinking that is under way. He formulates plans about how to extend the 
episode of drinking, and then tries to execute the steps of this plan, all the while revising these plans 
to achieve the same end in the face of new information he continues to receive. He continues to read 
his immediate perceptual environment in terms of his obsession, now in terms of the opportunities 
for prolonging the episode of drinking that is under way and in terms of obstacles to prolonging it. 
His way of drinking may involve special vigilance to time, to how quickly or slowly those with 
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whom he drinks, if any, are drinking, and also to how considerations about time affect the material 
possibilities for him to get more alcohol. His overriding fear is that there will not be enough alcohol 
to continue the episode of drinking or that something will interfere to bring it to an end. 
The possibility that a further, more fundamental kind of error is also involved in the chronic 
alcoholic’s motivation for drinking points to an explanatory role for another kind of defective variety 
of wakefulness. Suppose that the drinking of an alcoholic never, in fact, fitted the representation of 
drinking that figured in the relevant form of apparent recall, in which drinking is represented as a 
route to a normal wakeful state; a state in which the alcoholic ‘has complete freedom’ and in which 
‘the missing piece of the jigsaw is in place’. If that were so then the motivation for drinking, as it 
figures in explaining drinking in the state of obsession, involves a basic cognitive error. But why 
might this be true? What is the reason for thinking that an alcoholic’s drinking, even in the early 
phases of his drinking, was never drinking that initiated and sustained a healthy wakeful state of 
consciousness? Is it really plausible to claim that from the very first drink, the alcoholic drank in a 
way that manifested obsession with alcohol, in the way that it has been understood here? Doesn’t this 
also entail that we must refuse to take at face value those aspects of personal testimony that describe 
the spontaneity and freedom from care and worry that accompanied the alcoholic’s very early 
drinking career? 
The literature that has been the focus of our attention here describes the fundamental problem of an 
alcoholic as ‘self-centredness’. ‘Being self-centred’ (or ‘self-obsessed’) might pick out a personality 
characteristic, a set of personality characteristics, or habits of thought and action. These 
characteristics are things that rational agents can possess in dreamless sleep. But self-centredness 
might also be understood as an instance of the kind of state that has been at issue here; a defective 
instance of the wakeful condition that involves forms of incapacity that we might describe as broadly 
ethical, and patterns of thought and motivation that we might describe as ethically disordered or 
maladjusted. Very roughly, we might think of this state as involving incapacity with respect to those 
capacities that embody our ongoing sensitivity to, and practical acknowledgement of, the ethical 
demands made upon us, as rational agents, by other agents like ourselves. We might also think of it 
as involving incapacity with respect to the capacity to be sensitive to the demands that we ourselves 
also make on others as the rational beings we are, and toward what is rightly owed to us. These 
incapacities are revealed in the range of thoughts and feelings that strike the one who is so 
incapacitated in reflection, in patterns of practical deliberation in which the demands of others do not 
figure fundamentally, and in which action is only motivated by the agent’s own desires. But they 
might also be manifested, crucially, in a form of perceptual incapacity; an incapacity to experience 
our immediate perceptual environment as making characteristic sets of demands on us, as the rational 
beings that we are. Being self-centred in this sense, I emphasize, would not be to be psychopathic or 
sociopathic. Being disordered in such senses appears to involve an absence of the capacities 
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themselves; in individuals of such a kind these capacities never developed properly at all or have 
been destroyed through physical damage. Self-centredness, as I understand it here, is a condition in 
which capacities that the agent possesses are inaccessible in the circumstances, given the mental 
state. 
In order to establish the claim that the alcoholic’s motivation for drinking involves a cognitive error 
about the effects of alcohol on him, it need not be argued that from his initial experiments with 
drinking he was in a state of obsession with alcohol. For it may nevertheless be true of him, and it 
may be what marks out the early drinking experiences of alcoholics, that they take place in the state 
of ‘self-centredness’ or ‘self-obsession’. Developing an understanding of exactly what such a state is, 
and properly substantiating the thesis that a state such as this is distinctive of alcoholic drinking, 
even during the early stages of alcoholic drinking, requires more than I can do here. But the basic 
idea need be nothing more than the following. When alcoholics drink, one of the things that makes 
their drinking characteristically alcoholic is that it takes place against the backdrop of such a 
condition; an insensitivity to the demands that others make on them as the things that they are and an 
inability to entertain, as a basic reason for doing anything, what other people may want of them. 
Take any of the episodes of drinking from early in the careers of alcoholics, which are described in 
the pages of Alcoholics Anonymous, where those episodes are ones which would be later 
characterized in terms of ‘things making sense’ or ‘having a feeling of freedom’ or a ‘freedom from 
fear’. Now imagine that halfway through any such episode, as it actually occurred at the time of the 
episode of drinking, someone the alcoholic narrator held very dear had requested them to stop 
drinking right away, because there is something that they (the intervener) wanted to do which was 
incompatible with their (the drinker) continuing to drink. I predict the following: that while the 
alcoholic may eventually have acceded to such a request, it would have been met with more or less 
extreme irritation and reluctance, perhaps with hostility. The content of the request would not 
immediately strike the alcoholic as something that ought to be done and which in the situation was 
required. The request would be experienced as something to be avoided, resisted, or shrugged off by 
any available means. 
7. Conclusion 
Understanding the kind of disorder that is crucial to sustaining alcoholic drinking as a deformed state 
of wakeful consciousness has consequences for how to conceive aspects of recovery from 
alcoholism. I earlier briefly described recovery from alcoholism, according to the programme of 
Alcoholics Anonymous, as involving action geared around adjusting the alcoholic’s attitudes and 
outlook on life; action informed by the alcoholic’s establishing contact with ‘a God’ of his or her 
own ‘conception’, or a ‘Higher Power’. Were one to read these claims in terms of the suggestions 
made here then one might be led to propose that the fruit of recovery is the reclamation, on a 
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consistent basis, of a way of living that is characterized by the obtaining, during the waking hours, 
and on a reasonably consistent basis, a non-disordered state of wakeful consciousness.  
Given the account suggested here, that is something that involves, at least, capacitation with respect 
to a range of capacities for rational thought and rational action, where such action is also informed 
by, and embodies, a stored set of attitudes that encode the agent’s conception of what is worth caring 
about, at the core of which is the idea that other rational agents and their desires make demands on us 
which we ought to acknowledge. As I have been trying to emphasize, the alcoholic’s problem is not 
a problem with respect to what the agent knows or believes. Alcoholics coming around after binges, 
filled with guilt, shame and remorse, do not have to reacquire the knowledge that they are not 
capable of drinking safely, or that it is best for them not to drink at all. That is something that they 
knew all along. Neither need it be understood as a straightforward defect with respect to what the 
agent really values or cares about. The same alcoholic, returning to consciousness after relapse, does 
not need to relearn that it is worth caring for one’s family and friends, or worth valuing what other 
people want as well as what they themselves want. Rather, what is needed is for a state to obtain in 
which this knowledge is able to make itself manifest in the way that it is supposed to in rational 
agents who have it, and for a state to obtain in which these standing evaluations make themselves 
manifest in action in a way that they are supposed to.  
One might think of one way that Alcoholics Anonymous functions as the provision of a scaffold for 
supporting the state of non-deformed wakeful consciousness, or indeed for re-developing it. 
Alcoholics Anonymous does this by providing environments in which recovering alcoholics are able 
to do things with one another and for one another. Some of this might involve taking stock of the 
consequences of past behaviour and arriving at a full and balanced picture of the facts about their 
alcoholism with a sponsor. Or it may involve making tea. Either way, through doing these things, 
alcoholics are able to spend time living in a non-deformed state of consciousness. Spending time 
living in this state, and gradually feeling at home in it, strengthens the alcoholic’s dispositions to 
inhabit the normal wakeful state. But whatever exactly these dispositions might be, to possess these 
dispositions is not what recovery from alcoholism itself consists in. The alcoholic may possess these 
dispositions while he sleeps, or indeed, in relapse. Similarly, however, so also may an alcoholic who 
is ‘recovered’ by the lights of the kind of account sketched here possess a range of long-term 
dispositions and traits that distinguish him from non-alcoholics. The recovered alcoholic is not able 
to drink safely. The incapacity of his body to respond to the drinking of alcohol remains. Alcoholics 
who relapse after long periods of sobriety develop cravings soon after taking a drink, or exhibit the 
response to alcohol that characterized their previous drinking in the space of one or two further 
episodes of drinking. So also the recovered alcoholic is disposed to re-enter the state of occurrent 
self-obsession or self-centredness; the kind of disordered state of wakeful consciousness that it has 
been suggested here is the soil in which the potential for alcoholic drinking grows. This is why the 
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recovered alcoholic may find that he continues to need to engage with the supportive environment 
and activities that he finds in Alcoholics Anonymous on an ongoing basis. This is not because the 
recovered alcoholic becomes ‘addicted’ to Alcoholics Anonymous, or because he has become 
‘obsessed with’ attendance at meetings. It is because the dispositions that the recovered alcoholic 
possesses, as an alcoholic, for self-obsession and self-centredness, have as their natural manifestation 
the erosion of the structure of the non-disordered wakeful condition. 
The suggestions I have made here about akrasia in the chronic alcoholic are qualified. First, I do not 
present these ideas as suggestions about every instance of akrasia. Second, I have only here been 
talking about psychological or cognitive aspects of chronic alcoholism, and the coherence of a range 
of psychological claims associated with the perspective of a particular program of treatment and 
recovery. A full understanding of this condition would need also to address the nature of the 
‘phenomenon of craving’; something about which I have been neutral here.15 The suggestions are 
also programmatic in obvious respects. There remain significant questions about the precise nature 
of the various kinds of conditions of obsession mentioned here and how they differ from wakeful 
consciousness. And there is the further question of whether a properly developed account of this kind 
can provide a satisfactory explanation of the relevant psychological features of akrasia in alcoholism. 
That is something that I do not have the space to undertake here. But I hope to have made at least 
some kind of case for the view that the notion of a mental state that involves a specific kind of 
departure from the state of wakeful consciousness may be a fruitful way to understand important 
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